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Abstract: Seung-hoon Jeong discusses in his paper global action thrillers about the war on terror. He
highlights the biopolitical abjection of counterterrorist agents from their state agencies. This abjection
ends up either self-reaffirming in the manner of a sovereign agent (the Bond series) or terrorizing their
sovereign system (the Bourne series), while both are trapped in the vicious cycle of terror and
counterterror. More notable is the “mind-game” sci-fi genre. Source Code, among others, stages a loop
of a traumatic counterterrorist mission with retroactive causality, a closed circuit of neoliberal
productivity and pathological abjection in a video-game narrative. The time-travel motif here, however,
ultimately “undoes” sacrifice, problematically sacrificing the ethics of sacrifice. Finding no exit from the
sovereign system, the abject agent against it embraces the perpetual present of actions including
undoing traumas. This reinforced reaffirmation of sovereign agency underlies Hollywood’s new ideology
as seen in many other post-Source Code films.
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Seung-hoon JEONG
A Thin Line between Sovereign and Abject Agents: Global Action Thrillers with the Sci-Fi
Mind-Game War on Terror
Sovereignty, abjection, and agency: Hollywood action thrillers and spy films
Globalization is not just about making a planetary market of transnational neoliberalism, social
networking, and multicultural harmony. It also concerns how to protect this system of inclusion from its
symptoms of exclusion, inassimilable remnants or catastrophic risks such as terrorism. Consequently,
the war on terror has been the salient operation of the global system’s sovereign power to expel and
eradicate the fundamentalist “axis of evil” in the name of “infinite justice.” Globalization thus involves
globalized sovereignty in the biopolitical rather than political sense. It directly affects biological lives in
the globally same way of judging their eligibility for citizenship and detaining or deporting people
detected as useless or dangerous. Refugees or terrorists are even degraded to “bare life” like animals,
in Giorgio Agamben (1998)’s terms, to homo sacer who is cast out of law, and whose murder is thus
not a crime to punish. Any government is ready to realize this “state of exception” to the rule of law. In
other words, supralegal sovereignty underlies law itself. It can make anyone a homo sacer just as
ordinary people are presumed to be potential terrorists when passing an airport security checkpoint.
Let me reframe this biopolitical “desubjectivation” in terms of abjection.1 As widely known by Julia
Kristeva, abjection means one’s act of casting off something disgusting or threatening from oneself for
self-protection or ego-formation. While it is essential to establish a stable identity with the self/other
boundary, the abject is not reduced to a mere thing but lingers in the limbo state between subject and
object, self and other, life and death. By extension, an individual subject becomes an abject by being
cast out of its community. Imogen Tyler (2013) addresses such social abjection in the system of
neoliberal globalization and sovereignty. If global citizens are normal subjects granted sociopolitical
rights and subjectivity, the abject are global “non-citizens” bereft of them. They are often debased and
stigmatized as repulsive or harmful, easily targeted by all sorts of sovereign violence. They are nearneocolonial others of the global system, economically included in and legally excluded from it like illegal
immigrant workers. This “internal exclusion” of the abject resonates with the status of homo sacer who
is “included in the juridical order solely in the form of exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)”
(Agamben 8).
However, this ambivalence implies potentialities for change. As they try to regain subjectivity, the
abject are not mere passively victimized bare lives but have agency: the causative force to act and the
capacity to perform a task in the transitory mode of being-in-action. Agency performs “becoming-other”
at the moment of its activation, challenging fixed identity and enabling the performative, constructivist
notion of identity: not an a priori entity but an effect produced through abjection (which itself is an
agentic act). It is culturally articulated, yet also contesting preconstructed forms of identity in “the
necessary scene of agency” (Butler 201). In short, agency is the abject’s mode of subjectivity, temporary
and transitional, performative and modulable. The abject are, then, agents. They return to their former
community like the living dead or “undead” and act to fulfill a mission, mainly resubjectivation. “Abject
agency,” however, is also motivated by vengeance, sacrifice, saving or killing people. Terrorists are
“abject agents” as well, who attack the sovereign system by appropriating sovereignty in their selfproclaimed state of exception to law even at the cost of their lives. The terror-counterterror loop implies
the global struggle for sovereign power between the system and the abject.
Cinema presents this loop and struggle, above all, through “professional” agents of “institutional”
agencies like military or secret agents in state organizations. They are “sovereign agents” who exert
supralegal sovereignty with a “license to kill” for global policing as well as patriotic service. Post-9/11
Hollywood action thrillers are full of such agents, who are not only loaded with counterterror missions
but undergo transformative challenges and (self-)abjection. Especially notable is the recent trend of
combining sci-fi motifs such as time travel and parallel universes with the agents’ war on terror; the
trend that has been increasingly visible with its cutting-edge visual technology in the 2010s since Source
Code (Duncan Jones, 2011). I will investigate this seminal film and touch on related others. Before that,
however, let me note a precursory trend by comparing recent segments of the Bond series and the
Bourne films, a 21st-century gamechanger in the spy genre.
James Bond in Skyfall (Sam Mendes, 2012), for example, is deserted by his secret agency MI6 at
the beginning, but the supralegal role of MI6 is also put into question and nearly cast out of the
1

I concisely rephrase my elaboration of abjection and agency published elsewhere (Jeong, “Introduction”).
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government. That is, both the sovereign agent and agency face abjection, a symbolic death. The rest of
the film shows how they strive to restore their imperiled identity until their possible real death—films
on abjection typically unfold in this narrative of the double death: symbolic and real. Their counterterror
operation is then a kind of “qualifying exam” to test their necessity. This self-reaffirmation is made
against Silva, an ex-agent abandoned by MI6 and cyberterrorist who hacks and debunks the agency. In
sum, the global sovereign system produces the abject from within, who may then become either a
sovereign agent back (Bond) or a radical terrorist agent (Silva). Bond’s unusually aging, suffering body
materializes his precarious subjectivity like a “bare life,” barely defeating his doppelgänger-like enemy
to reclaim his identity. The boundary between the sovereign agency and the terrorist abject is indeed
blurred in Daniel Craig’s new millennial Bond films including Casino Royale (2006) and Spectre (2015).
There is only a thin line between subject and abject, between sovereign and abject agents.
It is the Bourne series that both revised and influenced the Bond series. In his continuous saga,
Jason Bourne appears as the enemy of his former agency CIA. But if Silva pursues pure revenge for
capital and power, Bourne turns from a counterterror warrior into a potential terrorist only to find hidden
truths. The series starts with his failure in a mission, his being shot and turning amnesiac. All the rest
chronicles his nomadic struggle to recover his memory and discover dirty operations of the CIA that
involved and now target him. Again, the beginning is the end of the hero’s normal life, his symbolic
death as traumatic abjection from his agency. His quasi-dead body floating in the sea visualizes a
rootless homo sacer that sovereign CIA agents want to eliminate outside the law. Never dying, however,
he reconstructs himself with his abject agency while resisting the unjust and corrupt state power that
abuses supralegal violence. He feels guilty for (possibly) killing (decent) people and pursues atonement
by paying off this guilt as ethical debt. Both a product and byproduct of the CIA, he is thus a justifiable
version of Silva. The film series fuses “Bond’s efficiency” with “Noam Chomsky’s politics” (Douthat) in
the age when the global war on terror inevitably causes collateral damage and even normalizes
emergency without ending terrorism.
It is clear where Bond and Bourne meet and part. Secret agencies as a protective gear of global
systems entail symptoms of precarious bare life; sovereign agents can turn into hackers or
whistleblowers. But Bond, though abjected, restores his sovereign agency and destroys terrorist abject
agents. This triumphant elimination of the villains is always reaffirmed in the 007 series. On the contrary,
Bourne’s traumatic abjection puts him under harsher conditions of bare life in a radically normalized
emergency. Bourne’s struggle with his lost memory, against the CIA, makes him an ethical abject agent
terrorizing the unethical system that trained him. The continuation of each franchise, however, indicates
that the sovereign system and the abject agent are inseparable and their antagonistic hide-and-seek
has no outside. This “infernal affair” of terrorism and counterterrorism allegorizes the impossibility of
one’s ultimate release from the global system, leaving only the fantasy of choice: Bond or Bourne? A
blue pill or a red pill?
Source Code: sci-fi mind-game and video-game in control society
Source Code complicates the question above in a more fresh and thought-provoking setting. It is not a
spy film but a clever combination of an action thriller, a sci-fi, and a “mind-game film.” The last,
according to Thomas Elsaesser (2009, 2018), plays games with a character who does not know what is
going on (Silence of the Lambs, Se7en, The Truman Show, etc.) or with the audience from whom crucial
information is withheld until the end (Fight Club, Memento, The Sixth Sense). Main characters usually
have an extreme mental condition or a psychic disorder, playing games with other characters’ or viewers’
perception of reality (A Beautiful Mind, Donnie Darko, Oldboy). Common motifs include the suspension
of causality, the delusion between reality and imagination, alternative timelines, parallel universes,
trauma and emotional disturbances, identity as contingency and fate as chance. Consequently,
storytelling is as complex as its diverse terminology: “forking-path,” “multiple-draft,” “modular,”
“fractal,” “puzzle” narratives—various of which terms I shall examine later on.2 No wonder a mind-game
film stimulates a philosophical “thought experiment,” raising ontological doubts about other minds or
worlds and epistemological questions about how we know what we know.
Source Code plays games with both the protagonist and the audience by centering on “time travel,”
another significant motif in the mind-game genre linked to many of the issues above as we will see. The
film begins with U.S. pilot Colter Stevens waking up on a train for Chicago without knowing why and
how because his last memory was of being on a mission in Afghanistan. More perplexingly, the woman

For an overview and various cases studies of complex narratives, see, among others, Warren Buckland’s edited
volumes on puzzle films (2008, 2014).
2
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sitting opposite Colter calls him Sean. This is Christina, a teacher colleague of Sean—whose face Colter
sees in the mirror instead of his own. Suddenly, the train explodes like a bolt out of the blue and
everyone dies. However, Colter again wakes up, this time in a dark cockpit, where someone called
Captain Goodwin appears on a screen and orders him to identify the train bomber before another bomb
hits Chicago in six hours—as per a warning given by the bomber. This mission to identify the train
bomber is conducted inside the “Source Code (SC),” a time travel device which can repeatedly send
Colter back into the last eight minutes of a passenger compatible with him racially and physically, namely
Sean, so that he can collect more and more clues regarding the identity of the terrorist. The underlying
logic is that postmortem memory lasts for eight minutes, during which Colter, though killed as Sean on
the train, can deliver the clues to Goodwin from the cockpit. That said, he has to die and resume his
extremely frustrating eight-minute lifespan over and over until completing the mission. It later turns
out that Colter was nearly killed in Afghanistan, losing most of his body, and has since been comatose
for two months on life support in the SC chamber beside Goodwin’s office. Only his brain and upper
torso is alive, hooked up to neural sensors to communicate with Goodwin in the brain-projected cockpit
on the one hand and combined with Sean’s body to act for the mission on the train on the other.
A turning point occurs when Colter learns about his physical abject state that is used to test the SC
with no chance of recovery. Angry, he demands to be disconnected from life support once the mission
is fulfilled, and Rutledge, the SC designer, agrees. Colter finally identifies the bomber, has him caught
by the authorities, and thus prevents the second explosion in Chicago. However, he is betrayed by
Rutledge, who orders Goodwin to wipe Colter’s memory for future missions—only for Goodwin, out of
sympathy, secretly to accept Colter’s request for euthanasia and to help him put into action a new plan,
namely to go back to the train one final time in order to prevent the first explosion and to save every
passenger on the train, this in spite of Rutledge’s insistence that such past events cannot be altered.
After fulfilling this plan, Colter uses the bomber’s phone to send an email to Goodwin and to call his
estranged father in order to reconcile with him under the guise of a fellow soldier (i.e. Sean). Colter
then kisses Christina at the moment when eight minutes have passed, and Goodwin takes him off life
support. He dies in the SC chamber, but he survives in the new alternate timeline in which the train
arrives safely into Chicago. Colter, now as Sean, enjoys a romantic walk with Christina around the city
center while Goodwin, in this new timeline, receives Colter’s email that says they have changed history
thanks to the excellent performance of the SC. The film ends with a chamber scene; Colter is lying there,
still comatose, waiting for his first mission yet to come.
What makes Source Code a unique mind-game film is its extreme video-game structure. As typically
seen in Run Lola Run (1998)—Lola’s 20-minute rush to save her boyfriend repeats three times until the
final success—some video-game features have been adapted for complex film narratives: a serialized
repetition of actions, multiple levels of adventure, mastering the rules and accumulating points,
immediate punishment and rewards, feedback loops and deadlines (Buckland, “Source” 187). In each
Bourne film too, discrete action sequences are comparable to increasingly challenging levels that Bourne
completes while exploring unknown places. This double game logic of “leveling-up” and “navigation”
also applies to the entire series and characterizes the protagonist/player not only as an agent but even
a “system”: an autopoietic feedback process of making itself in interaction with the environment.
Bourne’s body is a powerful sensorimotor system of speedy perception and action with the self-backup
function (curing himself after hurting, thus restarting like a game character); his mind is a selfinvestigating cerebral system for restoring damaged memory and lost identity. His cognitive-kinetic
mapping of subjective time and global space is a pathological human system’s struggle for selforientation in the dangerous world.
Source Code upgrades and complicates all these game features, using a double-layered, self-reflexive
“play station.” It is crucial that Colter’s mind is not solely injected into Sean’s body but mediated in the
form of his whole figure confined within the cockpit (unlike the paraplegic hero in Avatar whose mind
directly connects to his avatar). This cockpit itself is a virtual space where Colter as a projected image
makes some “rotation adjustments” and “pattern recognition” first to orient himself and identify Goodwin
(Hesselberth). Said otherwise, Colter’s brain on life support plays a preliminary “mind-video” game and
organizes a virtual psychosomatic system to cope with a new situation and learn from it. This mechanism
is extended into the main “mind-video” game in which Colter sees himself as Sean, his avatar to control
in a much more complicated situation. The film then “replicates a role-playing game” by going back and
forth between the player in the cockpit (game room) and his performance in the train (game world)
(Buckland, “Source” 195). Not to mention this game world has the structure of “leveling-up” and
“navigation,” reviving Colter’s eight-minute life eight times. Each time he collects pieces of information,
explores the train, tests different options, and forms relations with Christina and Goodwin. He thus
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builds himself up as an efficient cognitive-kinetic mapping system that accumulates data and takes
actions in the feedback loop of human and technological interactions, especially learning from his own
failures. Apparently, nobody could better personify Samuel Beckett’s dictum: “Fail again. Fail better”3
(see fig. 1)

Figure 1: Source Code

Source Code also shows a “modular narrative” that presents “forking paths” (Cameron and Misek).
Each train sequence is a module, or rather, the unseen last minutes of Sean’s life is the first module
that continues to be modulated with differences. David Bordwell (2008), however, argues that although
forking-path narratives display alternative worlds or parallel histories, they are not that complex but
still conventionally comprehensible. A key convention is “psychological continuity” that the protagonist
retains in visiting different futures, growing knowledge and even modifying personality through the
accumulated experience of the “past” futures as Scrooge does classically (182). That is, different
branches of a forking-path narrative do not strictly show incompatible “parallel” worlds as they are
linearly arranged and traversed, and therefore, the last branch becomes “the fullest, most satisfying
revision” of the past ones (184). Source Code is no exception. Moreover, the modulation of the original
reality is like refining the selfsame draft instead of writing a totally new one. The mind/video game
indeed presumes the gradual development of the mind through the deadline-bound progress of action
toward a conventional happy ending. The primary rule of the game is no other than that of classical
Hollywood narrative: character-driven, goal-oriented, problem-solving continuity.
Paradoxically, the postclassical newness of Source Code comes out of the very continuity that Colter’s
undamaged sober mind retains. Though physically comatose, he as the game player has no common
pathologies among mind-game films such as amnesia, paranoia, and schizophrenia. But as his inherent
brain can adequately function, he is under extreme pressure to maximize its capacity for figuring out a
puzzle in an insanely stressful situation set up by a ticking bomb. He suffers not from his mental
condition but from this external environment in which his performance, unless correctly done, gets him
punished by death again and again in his continuous mind. Traumatic are not only the flames of the
explosion that engulf him but also this helpless re-experience of being annihilated like a repeated
torment by an unforgettable terrible memory. What becomes complex is thus the narrative of double
death mentioned earlier; Colter, symbolically dead in a coma, struggles to survive until real death, but
this struggle in abjection itself is punctuated with multiple “deaths” which are both actual (in the train)
and virtual (in the SC). That is, within the limbo stage between two deaths, he dies several times and
prepares for revivals in the cockpit—his posthumous limbo in which he is neither really dead nor alive,
thus abject by definition. There are abjections within abjection.
Of course, Colter is not biopolitically abjected by his sovereign military system. From his physical
abjection, he is instead retrieved to work as an unprecedented sovereign agent who has to tackle all
the more challenging emergency, which no passenger in the train knows actually. The states of normalcy
This is often quoted as an entrepreneurial mantra to embrace failure as an essential step for lucrative selffulfillment. But such positive motivation has nothing to do with Beckett’s view of failure expressed in Worstword
Ho!: the inevitable defeat of every human endeavor and communication (Schlottman). Beckett’s edging to full
failure is co-opted as the progress toward full success in neoliberal capitalism.
3
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and exception coexist here on the brink of destruction. This dangerous, precarious condition both
requires and enables him to optimize the use of all his abilities and skills trained in the system including
the SC. Although he has no pathology, his agency with this maximal efficiency evokes “productive
pathologies” of mind-game film heroes (Elsaesser, “The Mind-Game” 28)—just as Bourne’s amnesia
boosts his activity. The notion of agency implies this ambivalence: it is motivated by a goal in certain
restricted circumstances which inhibit its achievement but would dissipate if it is achieved. The agent is
then impeded and empowered at once by constitutive constraints of action. Deterministic conditions
enable the performative activation of free will. Colter’s traumatic, claustrophobic train ride is a “closed
circuit” with no end, no exit, but his desperate acts open up unknown choices to make (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Source Code

Notable is the sociohistorical backdrop of the type of agency that Colter reflects, which broadly
resonates with the turn of modern “disciplinary society” to postmodern “control society” (Deleuze). If
the Foucauldian notion of discipline is a long-term process of subjectivation in a set of different, confining,
coercive institutions with central systems of plans, rules, surveillance and punishment, Gilles Deleuze
contrasts it with his somewhat ironic idea of “control.” The society of control does not govern individuals
from the top down but promotes self-control with the flexible agency, the capacity for continuous selfmodulation through numerous short-term projects as well as endless lifetime education. Individuals are
encouraged to be “free choosers” responsible for their choices, internalizing entrepreneurship and
adjusting to de-centered environments of information high-ways, boundless networking, and the free
circulation of capital. Control is thus a name for agency optimized for postindustrial cognitive, emotional,
and financial capitalism (see Hardt and Negri 2000). Capital exists as immaterial assets overwhelming
material ones: intellectual properties, affective services, financial goods. Its agents are required to
acquire knowledge and foreknowledge, relational and communicative skills, and technical adaptability
to high-speed data processing. We are in fact all such agents, often distracted with information overload
during our daily practices of digital multitasking. Mind-game films, then, appear “as disciplinary
machines to re-format the body in view of tasks/affordances that control society requires from its
dysfunctional functioning members” (Elsaesser, “Contingency” 33). The new society disciplines us in this
new way of controlling—or forcing us to control—new cognitive-kinetic skills.
This late-capitalist society is inseparable from neoliberal globalization. While work becomes flexible
in the free market of people, goods, services, and capital without borders, workers become easily hurt,
casualized, fired, and dehumanized in an economic “war of all against all.” In this new Hobbesian state
of Nature, the safety net to protect precarious labor from aggressive capitalization disintegrates to the
extent that abjection is no longer exceptional but normalized. The abjection, as well as all dangers that
Bond and Bourne undergo, allegorizes this working condition. Colter’s case is all the more traumatic as
he loses not his job but his life, and he needs not just self-healing but self-rebooting with continuous
upgrading. Moreover, his temporary work under a pressing deadline leaves no second for leisure. He
has to rapidly adjust to unpredictable situations while reinforcing cognitive power, mapping ability,
corporeal tenacity, flexible mobility, and other qualities demanded in a globally expanded workspace
and competitive market. He is, namely, a casual worker who works like an entrepreneur, “resolving the
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quandaries generated by vexingly volatile and constantly changing circumstances” in the age that
Zygmunt Bauman (2006, 3–4) dubs “liquid times”—the current postpolitical age when social structures,
welfare systems, solidarity, and long-term plans, all decompose and melt.
However, it is crucial that the “liquid” condition of life and work—which are now indistinguishable—
is sustained by the “solid” sovereign system of global capitalism, its security apparatuses for the
automated surveillance and supralegal intervention. This system, as well as American cinema reflecting
it, adapts “the working population to the social technologies that promise their economic survival,
maintain civic cohesion, and assure America’s hegemonic position in the world” (Elsaesser,
“Contingency” 33). Superhero-like secret agents are harbingers of the “new normal” that applies to us
in this context (14). Subjects are thus still ideologically reproduced in this postideological era, but only
as self-contradictory agents like “CEO-workers.” They embody the anarchic notion of control, selfmaking freedom and free-floating autonomy, which is virtually controlled by the system that constantly
tests their workability or disposability — this ambivalence colors Colter as an apparently sovereign yet
potentially abject agent. What matters for the system is not his selfhood based on memory but his
action to perpetuate even at the cost of his memory. He at best makes a deal for euthanasia, which the
system unilaterally breaches. He is thus less than a mercenary, enslaved forever and deprived of dignity,
unable to kill himself yet forced to die endlessly.
Source Code: time travel, performative agency, the sacrifice of sacrifice
Obviously, Colter’s agency is defined as nothing but functionality. Time travel—or “time reassignment”
in Rutledge’s expression—is mobilized to optimize his counterterrorist function. I elsewhere noted three
narrative forms of the sci-fi disaster genre (Jeong, “The Apocalyptic” 75–76): (1) A disaster occurs early
and the rest of the story focuses on postcatastrophic redemption (Jurassic Park, Independence Day);
(2) The story unfolds precatastrophic efforts to prevent a predicted disaster (Armageddon, Dark City);
(3) Combining these two, time travel is used to send the protagonist from a postcatastrophic situation
back to a precatastrophic time in order to prevent the assumed disaster (Terminator, Twelve Monkeys).
We can examine the third case in light of America’s growing obsession with what Richard Grusin (2004)
calls “premediation,” namely the “remediation” of the future. It is that U.S. media have been trying to
prevent the immediacy of such traumatic shocks as 9/11 by replaying their images and anticipating
possible contingencies so that one could be better prepared for any catastrophe, which “would always
already have been premediated” (8–16). Sci-fi films upgrade this premediation to imaginative
prevention. The “Precrime” system in Minority Report (Steven Spielberg, 2002) foreshows impending
crimes, which agents rush to stop from happening. Proactive premediation promotes precatastrophic
preemption. Déjà Vu (Tony Scott, 2006) buckles down to time travel even to defuse a past terrorist
bombing. An agent travels back four days into the past utilizing a space-folding device to forestall the
bombing and the murder of a woman with whom he fell in love only through the surveillance “timewarp” screen. What has already happened appears as what should/could have been averted and even
turns into what has not happened. The sovereign agent sutures the trauma by “undoing” the terror.
The desire to undo a past event emerges in the tense of the “if-only”: if only I had done not “A” but
“B” to prevent it! This regret begins with Freudian “retroaction,” the “deferred action” of looking
backward in time to detect causes for later effects. I belatedly understand that “A” was the real cause
of the event in the way of positing “A” in a causal chain hitherto unknown to my mind. Causality is thus
less an objective relation of events than a subjective inference drawn by the observer. That is why
historians describe historical events as if they necessarily had to happen from the present perspective
and a narrative “‘configures’ what would otherwise be a simple succession of events into a ‘meaningful
whole’” of causes and effects (Simons 121–22). Likewise, one can overcome trauma by articulating its
fragmented memories in a lucid narrative. It is the symbolic process of facing and accepting the cause
of the trauma, thereby leaving the past behind and moving toward the future—like the psychoanalytic
turn from “melancholia” to “mourning.” This retroactive causality implies our potential to change the
past if not actually but at least etymologically and ethically: I do not merely find “A” in the past but
insert “A” into the past, which thus changes into a new past, and I choose “A” as the determinant cause
of the fatal event. The causality, paradoxically, loses its fateful force then because I embrace the given
as chosen of my own free will. My freedom breaks the closed circle of determinism, realizing Nietzschean
amor fati: Love your fate and you’ll be freed from it! This freedom is in truth Kantian, neither entirely
determined by preceding causes nor dependent on pure contingency. Although I am determined by
various causes, I am free “to retroactively determine which causes will determine me” including causes
I can posit in the past. Not opposing determinism, freedom thus takes on retrospective determinism, a
self-determined necessity that is recognized, constituted, and assumed after the fact. “The effect is
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retroactively the cause of its cause” in this après-coup (Žižek 202–04). Retroaction enables a cognitive
time travel to cause an unthought cause of the present effect.
Sci-fi time travel physically realizes this retroaction, literally going back to the past and engaging in
some causes for future effects. That is to say, I see not only “A,” the cause of my trauma, but also a
new possibility of having chosen “B” that would not have caused the trauma. Not limited to accepting
the only option, my free will then turns into “freedom of choice” among different options. Not loving my
fate, I want to cancel it and make a new one. Not moving on to mourning for the dead, I will carry my
melancholia until eradicating its cause and saving the dead back in the past. This potential for changing
the actual past stimulates sci-fi time travel for precatastrophic prevention. Source Code realizes it to
“reverse castration in the aftermath of 9/11, for a veteran’s severed body and Homeland Security”
(Stewart 172). There occur even multiple time travels with new choices of C, D, E, F… The film multiplies
a cinematic equivalent of “virtual history,” pivoting around a fork of the “if-only” that branches off to
multiple “what-if” situations. The past is repeatedly rewritten with newly posited causes. From the
cognitivist viewpoint, the past is indeed a palimpsest overwritten with “nearly true hypothetical points”
that may have been elided yet still present within the mind (Branigan 109–10). Such points are explicitly
arranged in multiple-draft films, especially in “the repeated action plot” that shows a character growing
“by enlightenment” at each repetition as do Run Lola Run and Groundhog Day (Harold Ramis, 1993)
(Berg 30–31).
However, unlike a common belief, Source Code does not adequately present a branching multiverse
of ontologically distinct worlds parallel to the actual one. The eight-minute train time is a segment of
the past that Colter virtually revisits while actual time still passes in the present, in which another bomb
is ticking and to which he comes back after every virtual death to talk to Goodwin. The repetition-withdifferences of his action does not bring any actual alternative reality insofar as the loop of the past
remains reassigned by, derived from, and thus subordinated to, the present. The only way to create a
new reality is to break the linear connection between the past and the present by changing not small
details in the self-closed circuit but its constitutive condition itself. That is, “if only” the train had not
been bombed in the first place, the SC would not have been used and reality would have been different.
To change this fundamental cause of the present situation, to “undo” the train bombing, is what Rutledge
prohibits—who privileges testing his program to saving passengers—but what Colter finally pursues as
an authentic big cause at the cost of his life. The sovereign agent then turns into a self-abjected agent
of a self-imposed mission against the sovereign system. Likewise, phoning his father and growing a
romantic attachment to Christina are unexpected outcomes of his performance that go beyond the rules
of the game. Evoking and updating Bourne, Colter embodies “abject agency” to resist his sovereign
system that exploits his abject body and wants to “abject” the passengers for its self-sustaining
mechanism. He does so by abjecting himself from the system while saving the passengers from being
abjected by it.
Nevertheless, did Colter really sacrifice himself to save the passengers including Sean, or does he
actually sacrifice Sean to date with Christina in the alternate timeline? The director approves of the
latter (Brevet), but it entails the contradiction that Colter’s mind resides in both Sean’s body and his
vegetative body still alive in the new reality; how could he then work as an SC agent (whose mind plugs
into someone’s body) without conflicting with his mind inside Sean? Although time travel itself is
paradoxical, the film’s otherwise entirely realistic diegesis could be consistent on the assumption that
the mind-body unity is retained and sustains one’s identity even if one’s mind takes another’s body in a
virtual time loop. It would thus be reasonable to consider that Colter’s mind died in the train when his
life support was switched off, and Sean’s mind, which was replaced by Colter’s but held in a sort of
coma, comes back to his body in the new timeline. It would also make sense that along with Colter’s
death, the original timeline is closed—we don’t see it anymore—because its changed past (no train
explosion) cancels the premise of the present (using the SC). In effect, it cannot but be closed somehow
once the train is saved because of this linear causality. The new timeline is the only actual reality, and
there are no multiple, parallel worlds. Even if Colter had not chosen to die, he would have disappeared
with the entire postterror situation getting “undone.” Moreover, though seemingly self-sacrificial, his
death is a case of euthanasia for his own “rest in peace” as well as a kind of “suicidal terror” against the
inhuman sovereign system. It is not a self-sacrificial death.
His sacrifice is made nonetheless, not with the choice of death but with the choice of undoing the
bombing. The latter terminates his life as just said and resurrects the dead passengers including Sean,
who may then become Christina’s boyfriend on behalf of Colter. Telling is the penultimate scene of Colter
and Christina reaching the sculpture Cloud Gate in Chicago. Its earlier imagery appears in the flashforwards that flash across Colter’s mind upon his repetitive virtual death, just like “an unconscious scene
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of desire (almost subliminal in its fragmentation) getting realized by dint of heroic faith and persistence”
(Stewart 81). To put it another way, he may have unconsciously inserted a new “effect” (enjoying
Chicago) in the future and finally chooses the “cause” (saving the train) that would bring this effect. Not
retroactive but “proactive” causality works here, just as Christina’s ironic words right before the first
explosion, “everything is gonna be ok!” promote his performative quest for an alternative future in which
“everything should be ok.” Facing the sculpture, Colter—now Sean as reflected on its warped surface—
recognizes it and asks Christina, “Do you believe in fate?” This sense of déjà vu may imply a residual
unconscious link between Colter’s and Sean’s mind, an uncanny ethical feeling that one is somehow
mediated by and indebted to the other. This connection is mutually beneficial: Christina finds Sean
(Colter) more than usually active and attractive in the train and falls in a romantic mode in Chicago;
Colter finally reconnects with his father by consoling him on his own (impending) death in the name of
Sean as if Sean ventriloquized Colter. The time-travel action adventure thus entails a romantic/family
subplot of remasculinization and reconciliation. Colter helps Sean to be a charming man, and Sean helps
Colter to be a good son (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Source Code

The ending is open to yet another hermeneutic turn. Garrett Stewart touches on the possibility that
the SC might have programmed the flash-forwards as “appeasing free-associations of potential escape,
anodyne images (u-topic, place-less)” (181) to unconsciously reward Colter for each traumatic death
“with an erotic afterlife, the secular correlative of a jihadist’s harem in the sky” (177). Although this
sounds like a conspiracy theory, it is not unlikely that the system could inject into its agents the illusory
hope for escaping from it, a sort of “cruel optimism” that enslaves them to make any escape impossible.
But more crucially, it must be noted that Colter reappears as a potential sovereign agent in the new
reality, and in his email to Goodwin, he praises the SC and asks her to tell this comatose double of
himself, “everything is gonna be ok!” Despite his suicidal resistance to the system, he thus eventually
endorses the system and reclaims his recyclable agency in it. Escaping into another reality ends up with
the same system and job, but now, this is “okay.” The abject agent is replaced by/reset as another
sovereign agent, who might work better under the “okay” sign and even feel “okay” about the traumatic
cycle of virtual death. This self-reaffirmation of sovereign agency, as well as the dream of liberation
from the system, indeed sustains the system that has no utopian outside. If each Bourne film ends with
Bourne fleeing from the CIA (though he always returns in the sequel), Colter’s death as the ultimate
nirvana rather brings back his life in the new reality with the same old system. That is, he is not really
sacrificed. Not only the train bombing but also his self-sacrifice to undo it are undone. Time is rewound
and the past is rewritten, but the virtual loop of this process itself is undone. Nothing happened, nobody
died, and the entire reality including Colter’s sacrifice disappeared. Not another parallel Colter but the
same Colter who was lying in the chamber before the train explosion is still lying there after the train’s
safe arrival.
What is sacrificed is the value of sacrifice as such. This “sacrifice” of sacrifice thus poses a new ethical
dilemma—albeit one that we can take as an old philosophical aporia to reflect on anew. The appreciation
of sacrifice presupposes that a sacrifice “works” only insofar as it is recognized as an act selflessly done.
But this recognition itself repays sacrifice even if symbolically, thus inevitably involving it in an economy
of give-and-take or investment-and-return. Those who sacrifice themselves are rewarded by the
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symbolic Other with indebtedness, respect, or honor, often elevated to an ethically superior or privileged
position. However, sacrifice essentially implies a “holocaust” of all (holos) being burned (caustos), a
selfless giving without reserve, calculation, or reward (Keenan 1). It must be “a sacrifice for nothing”
by transcending all its secular values and severing links to the symbolic order that commemorates it as
a sacrifice. That is, it must sacrifice the economic understanding of sacrifice. Like the Derridean notions
of gift and hospitality, sacrifice is also “a work that unworks itself in the very performance of the work”
(3). This sacrifice of sacrifice underlies Jesus’ maxim: “do not let your left hand know what your right
hand is doing” and “your Father who sees in secret will reward you” (2). If any big Other exists and
repays sacrifice, it is only God. However, this divine reward registers the pure sacrifice back in another
secret economy. The sacrifice of sacrifice is thus doubled: the “terrestrial” economic sacrifice is sacrificed
into the “deconstructive” aneconomic sacrifice, which in turn is sacrificed into the (celestial) economic
sacrifice. In sum, I claim, sacrifice “overdoes” itself; it is inherently “overdone.”
Colter seems to be a perfect “secret” agent of pure sacrifice; Sean has no idea of what Colter did
borrowing his body, and Goodwin, the only witness to Colter’s sacrifice, has no memory of it in the new
reality. There is neither social recognition nor divine redemption. Nonetheless, his virtual sacrifice costs
him nothing. It instead brings back his actual life, a potentially more empowered sovereign agent
destined to be “okay.” It is this “reassigned” life that sacrifices his sacrifice itself, not “overdoing” but
“undoing” it. In yet another sense it is we, the spectators, who appreciate the ethical sublimity of his
sacrifice from an Other’s position that is both social—we see him as our hero—and transcendent—we
don’t belong to his diegesis. The film thus creates the comforting illusion of his sacrifice being
remembered and given significance, even though it is skillfully canceled. In this way both the
conventions of the tragedy and the happy ending work; his death causes a cathartic effect to audiences,
who then feel reassured of his survival, which erases the very death just seen. The thing is that Colter
is not reborn or recreated as a cyborg agent like RoboCop but restarts his life in the changed reality.
The traumatic past is not overcome but undone. It serves not as the base of continuous memory but as
a sample segment of time to test the potentiality of “undoable” action. This “undoability” may signal the
future direction of sovereign agency. Agents could perform endless self-sacrifice in secret even without
feeling embarrassed by its being undone once they accept it as their normal work. The sovereign system
could not be more hegemonically served by its agents then (figure 4).

Figure 4: Source Code

The ideology of “undoing” in the perpetual present of action
To recapitulate briefly, the global system of sovereign agency has been ever more monstrous in action
thrillers. Bond and Bourne undergo the vicious cycle of terror and war on terror in the normalized state
of exception. Their sovereign and abject agency alternate and fuse in the perpetual present of 24/7
labor and precarious life with no utopian future. Colter’s traumatic loop intensifies this postpolitical
neoliberal temporality while also figuring a way out of it. He pursues not postcatastrophic redemption
but precatastrophic prevention by abjecting and sacrificing himself to open up a new future. However,
the new world is not new but more monstrous as it is the same world waiting for (the use of the SC
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against) unpredictable threats “minus” the chance and dream of leaving it.4 Colter starts as a sovereign
agent, then resists the sovereign system through abject agency like Bourne, but eventually reclaims
sovereign agency to fight potential terrorism like Bond. A traumatic event is undone but presumed to
occur anytime, to redo itself. Colter’s self-abjecting sacrifice, its ethical and existential significance are
all undone within this system but also could be redone whenever needed. “Undoing” does not lead to
redemption but only to “redoing,” which nonetheless brings the mood of a happy ending.
Recent sci-fi mind-game films go further than Source Code. Once a fighter in Edge of Tomorrow
(Doug Liman, 2014) finds out that time is supernaturally rewound to the starting point of his mission
upon his death, he even takes advantage of this loop by killing himself whenever something goes wrong
in his mission to stop an alien invasion. Death is no longer a trauma but a simple “game over” that
enables him immediately to “start over” (as in Groundhog Day). It is better to die before the situation
gets worse and undoing it is as easy as deleting what is just written by pressing the backspace key.
With no pain or regret, he exhibits ever-upgrading practicality: correcting mistakes, enhancing
performance, “edging” to tomorrow. At the climax of the film, he loses this capacity of resetting time
but seizes one final chance to kill the head of the aliens at the cost of his female colleague. Then, thanks
to the transference of the enemy’s inherent time-reversing power to him, he awakens in the world of a
day ago in which her sacrifice is undone but retroactively effective as all the aliens are mysteriously
gone. It is not a parallel world but a “backspaced-then-upgraded” world. Losing nothing, he is even
empowered with the time-reset button embedded in his sovereign agency. Likewise, such an unexpected
happy ending closes Oblivion (Joseph Kosinski, 2013). Though time travel does not occur here, a security
repairman on a postapocalyptic Earth discovers that the so-called aliens are not his enemies but the
humans fighting against the real aliens, who colonized most of the humankind and cloned him into many
sovereign agents serving the alien regime. He then joins the resistance group, that is, turns into an
abject agent, and sacrifices himself to destroy the alien headquarters. The film ends with a clone of his
appearing to his wife in the restored world as if he was not sacrificed and would resume his marriage.
The undead agency to undo/redo everything could not be more practically efficient but all the more
ideologically dubious. This ambivalence is conspicuous in the Hollywood remake of Ghost in the Shell
(Rupert Sanders, 2017). Here too, a sovereign agent has an identity crisis. She remembers that she
was orphaned by a terrorist attack and transformed into a counterterrorist cyborg, but it turns out that
this memory was implanted; that she and her cyberterrorist enemy were both anarchic radicals abducted
by a cybernetics company as test subjects (like 98 other failed ones); that she had taken her life while
in custody before being reborn as the first successful cyborg. However, this self-discovery does not
prompt her to resist or leave the sovereign system. She retrieves her former solidarity with the
terrorist—now an abject agent—but refuses to merge his mind with hers. She kills the CEO of the
company but rejoins her state agency. She reconnects with her original mother but returns to work as
an ever-repairable sovereign agent. The film ends with her oft-repeated words: “We cling to memories
as if they define us, but what we do defines us. My ghost survived to remind the next of us that humanity
is our virtue. I know who I am, and what I’m here to do.” In sum, her traumatic past is unearthed only
to be sutured into corrected memories, which should not bother her present actions. This mourning
process illusively reconciles her past leftist activism with her present sovereign operation while in effect
leaving the past behind and embracing the present as the sole base of identity. It reveals the state’s
involvement in the dirty business of the cyborg industry, yet also legitimizes the state’s sovereign agency
against terrorism and punishes only the industry’s ruthless exploitation of bare lives although they both
work supralegally. The sovereign system is then justified as the guardian of “humanity,” in the name of
which her posthuman body is reassembled whenever damaged as if nothing happened and no pain is
remembered.
The self-reaffirmation of sovereign agency after self-doubt is indeed the core experience of secret
agents today. It implies their positive internalization of the system’s ever-increasing flexibility and
inescapability at once. They are trained as subjects with free will to accept sovereign agency, however
vulnerable, and focus only on actions for given missions. They embody neoliberal subjectivity that is
both entrepreneurial and precarious like “CEO-workers,” perpetually trapped in the present of
overworking at the risk of being abjected from the efficiency-driven capitalist market. Sci-fi films further
depict the technological recreation and co-option of the abject (agents) as (replaceable) sovereign
In light of the special theme of this journal issue, the world as “monstrous” here is not a mere metaphoric cliché.
The monster is by nature deformed and repulsive due to its hybridity and abjection; that is, it is not a totally
unknown thing but a mixture of different species unacceptable to their normal order. Likewise, the monstrosity of
the global sovereign system implies the indistinction between normalcy and emergency, terror and war on terror,
and sovereign and abject agency.
4
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agents. Time travel or bioengineering brings cloned or reformatted agents at the end, whose memorybased identity is not that of sacrificed protagonists, but whose action-oriented mission is the same.
Problematic is the intended effect that this “happy” ending seems to achieve poetic justice without
sacrificing our heroes. It indicates a new level of the fictive resolution that Elsaesser (2018, 26–33)
notes. He argues that mind-game films provide “imaginary solutions to real contradictions” (like the
myths in Lévi-Strauss) while also exposing the “black boxes” of gaming such as time travel that create
seemingly valid but ultimately incompatible realities. That is, they suggest dilemmas that have no
solutions except formal, ludic ones. Devising such solutions is a productive way of “living with
contradiction,” but it also implies the impossibility of changing the actual situation (37). However, what
is new is that the films discussed so far do not merely offer virtual solutions to the terror-counterterror
cycle but instead end up assuming it as the unsolvable contradiction and shifting the focus from breaking
the cycle to better preparing for its rerun by training more adaptable agents who prioritize action over
memory or anything else. This shift reflects today’s sovereign system and a future model of agency
which could be pursued realistically even without time travel or memory implant. In short, these films
premediate somewhat feasible solutions and promote the world to pursue them.
Is cinema good for the world then? Or rather, could we welcome such a future world as prefigured
on screen? Time travel and other mind games are motivated to save the past from trauma or catastrophe,
but this salvation appears as if it is the minimal ethical condition for the justification of the present.
Essential questions about life, sacrifice, or humanity are put aside while the sovereign system reduces
ethics to a simplistic imperative of saving “innocent people” and a Manichean dualism of dividing
innocence and evil based on conformity or resistance to the system itself. This moral reductionism allows
nothing but action to realize it. Unless sovereign agents kill innocent people, the perpetual present of
their action entailing supralegal violence is legitimized. Life is either merely innocent or eternally active.
Let’s ask: Is this life desirable? Does it have the sanctity of life to save? We will have to address these
fundamental questions.
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